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ESSAY
THE TAO OF FEDERALISM
CALVIN R. MASSEY
So long as we continue to maintain a federal system, we will
argue about the process by which we allocate power between the
central government and the States. Those arguments take
familiar forms. The principal dispute concerns the degree to
which federalism ought to be primarily politically enforceable or
judicially enforceable. Politically enforceable federalism leaves
undisturbed the boundaries of state and federal power
produced by the national political process. Judicially enforceable
federalism regards the scope of federal power as an issue of
constitutional law susceptible to and requiring judicial
resolution. Neither side has ever achieved total victory, nor will
it. But the debate at least ought to be conducted with a
principled methodology rather than the brazen expediency that
sometimes characterizes the Supreme Court's discussion of
these issues.
This is a tale in three parts. The first illustrates the Court's use
of diametrically opposed premises to resolve two cases in a
manner that showed no awareness of its blatant inconsistency.
The second part reveals the Court's badly flawed method of
deciding federalism issues. The third explores the extreme
difficulty of altering the Court's deeply ingrained approach to
federalism, even when the Court summons the nerve to enforce
federalism values judicially.
These three segments show a Court that fails to understand
the "Tao of federalism." Lest the reader's eyes roll at this
moment, I hasten to add that this Essay is not a bizarre
excursion into some New Age, crystalline vision of the
Constitution. The Tao of federalism is pure metaphor, but one
that may help to restore some clarity in our consideration of
* Professor of Law, Hastings College of Law, University of California.
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federalism, an issue that Justice O'Connor has called "perhaps
our oldest question of constitutional law."'
The "Tao" (or the "way," as it is usually translated) is a
philosophic world-view that originated some 2500 years ago in
China. Lao-tzu's Tao Te Ching, which may have been the original
book of virtues, expresses the essence of Taoism-the idea that
an implicit harmony exists in all relationships.2 Denial or
avoidance of this harmony simply creates confusion, difficulty,
and troubles of all kinds. This harmony is experiential; it is not
readily captured by words. As Robert Wilson, the big-game
hunter, said to Francis Macomber in one of Hemingway's
stories, "[d]oesn't do to talk too much about all this."' But one
way to describe the Taoist insight is to note the inescapable fact
of duality: without darkness there can be no concept of light;
wet is understood only because there is also dry; the value of life
inheres in the knowledge of certain death. As Lao-tzu put it:
Being and non-being create each other.
Difficult and easy support each other.
Long and short define each other.
High and low depend on each other.
Before and after follow each other.4
Taoism represents this duality in its familiar yin-yang symbol,
the intertwined teardrops each of which contains the seed of the
other.5
1. NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
2. SeeLAO-TZU, TAO TE CHING (Stephen Mitchell trans., Macmillan 1988).
3. Ernest Hemingway, The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber, in THE SHORT
STORIES OF ERNEST HEMINGWAY 3, 33 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953) (1927) . If you
prefer Lao-tzu: "[T]he more you talk of [the Tao], the less you understand." LAO-TZtl,
supra note 2, at 5. Or "Those who know don't talk. Those who talk don't know." Id. at 56.
4. LAO-TZU, supra note 2, at 2. Similarly,
We shape clay into a pot,
but it is the emptiness inside
that holds whatever we want.
We hammer wood for a house,
but it is the inner space
that makes it livable.
We work with being,
but non-being is what we use.
Id. atll.
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Now what has this got to do with federalism? The essence of
federalism is not so much that the Framers "split the atom of
sovereignty," as Justice Kennedy has put it,6 but that the Framers
conceived the atom of sovereignty to consist of two parts that
cannot exist without each other. Just as yin contains a dot of
yang, and yang a speck of yin, the extent of federal power can
only be understood by thinking about the powers of the States,
and the powers of the States can only be understood in terms of
the scope of federal powers. Ever since Justice Stone labeled the
Tenth Amendment a "truism,"7 it has been vogue to assume that
the crux of federalism is simply to chart the extent of federal
powers. Everything left over belongs to the States. That is like
saying we will understand yang by charting yin: Whatever is not
yang must be yin. Or, it is like trying to understand life by
dissecting death: Through the autopsy of all things dead we will
learn the meaning of life. After all, if it is not dead, it must be
living.
As Hemingway's weather-beaten hunter observed, it is better
not to talk too much, especially when you are trying to explain
the Tao. Consider instead the following examples of the Court's
federalism jurisprudence, in which the discourse is mostly about
law. Perhaps you will experience the Tao somewhere along the
way.
I. Do MEMBERS OF CONGRESS REPRESENT THE NATION OR THE
STATES?
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the
Court rejected judicially enforceable limits upon Congress's use
of its commerce power to regulate the States, holding that the
principal mechanism "to ensure the role of the States in the
federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government
itself."9 That structure gives the States "control of electoral
5. A good introduction to the Tao, especially because its mechanism of instruction is
illustration, is BENJAMIN HOFF, THE TAO OF POOH (1982). If you insist on a scholarly
treatment (which of course takes most of the Tao out of it), see EVA WONG, THE
SHAMBHALA GUIDE TO TAoIsM (1997).
6. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 839 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
7. SeeUnited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
8. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that a metropolitan transit authority was not entitled
to Tenth-Amendment immunity from minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act).
9. Id. at 550.
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qualifications" of their congressional representatives and
ensures "the States' equal representation in the Senate," a
provision emphasized "by the prohibition of any constitutional
amendment divesting a State of equal representation Without
the State's consent."' To the Court, this structure was the
principal method of protecting state autonomy.
In short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in
which special restraints on federal power over .the States
inhered principally in the workings of the National
Government itself.... State sovereign interests... are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power.
All of this appeal to structure was couched at a high level of
abstraction, coupled with a convenient embrace of the Framers'
original intentions (on this occasion, for some unexplained• • ° 12
reason, those intentions seemed clear and controlling) . But the
Court buttressed its argument by noting that federal regulatory
schemes often exempt States. 3 The abstract and the practical
combined to demonstrate that "the principal and basic limit on
the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional
action-the built-in restraints that our system provides through
state participation in federal governmental action. The political
10. Id. at 551.
11. Id. at 552.
12. The debate concerning whether the "original intentions" of the Framers can be
known and, if so, whether those intentions are irrelevant, advisory, persuasive, or
dispositive to our present decisions about constitutional meaning is too long to be
encapsulated here. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997)
(arguing that original understanding is the only approach consistent with democratic
government), ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) (same), and
Edwin Meese III, Address Before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov.
15, 1985), in 19 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 22 (1985) (arguing that original intent can be
known and should be respected out of fidelity to the Constitution) with H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985)
(arguing that the Framers did not expect their intent to govern for all time), and H.
Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987) (arguing that resort to
original intent does not obviate the need for subjective judgments about the law). See
generally Symposium, Orginalism, Democracy, and the Constitution, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 237 (1996) (discussing the nature of originalism, normative and historical
indeterminacy, and alternative theories of constitutional interpretation). Whatever the
merits of the debate, the Court employs or eschews original intentions in a seemingly
random fashion. Without reliable knowledge of the Justices' motives, it would be unfair
to suggest that the Court's guiding principle on this choice is pure expediency.
13. See Carcia, 469 U.S. at 553.
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process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not
be promulgated.'
4
How, exactly, will this supreme confidence in the federal
political process be manifested? The Court gave no explicit
answer, but surely its reliance on structural intention and
practical result delivered an inferential one. Congress can be
relied upon to respect the States and to not impede state
autonomy excessively, because Congress will have state, not
federal, interests at heart. Why? Because Congress is composed
of representatives of the States; members of Congress owe fealty
to their respective States. They are politically accountable to
state electorates, reside in their States (at least until they head
off to Georgetown or suburban Maryland or Virginia), and thus
are peculiarly responsible to their States. In short, they represent
the States, not the nation, and can be safely relied upon to
exercise federal power in a fashion that respects the basic value
of federalism-divided power between the States and the central
government. If this is not the case, there is no reason to suppose
that the national political process will assign any particular value
to state interests. If members of Congress represent the nation,
not their States, we should expect them to prefer national
interests over state ones whenever the two collide.
But because we can safely rely on members of Congress to
represent the States in federal assembly, "[a]ny substantive
restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause powers must find
its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limitation,
and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the
national political process.. . ,' The Court has done just that, by
fashioning a new doctrine of "process autonomy' 6 out of such
cases as South Carolina v. Baker,' Gregory v. Ashcroft, and New York
14. Id. at 556.
15. Id. at 554.
16. For a description of this doctrine, see Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some
Implications of "Process Federalism," 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 175 (1994) (discussing
and criticizing the Court's attempt to preserve federalism values through procedural,
rather than substantive, limitations on Congress's power over the States).
17. 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (finding no Tenth-Amendment violation where Congress
removed the tax exemption for bearer bonds issued by state and local governments).
18. 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (declining, in the absence of a clear statement from Congress,
to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to a provision of the Missouri
Constitution that provides a mandatory retirement age for state judges).
No. 3]
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v. United States.'9 Justice O'Connor has been the intellectual
leader of this development, which suggests that even the Garcia
dissenters are willing to accept the premise that the national
political process is composed of a Congress of state
representatives, not federal representatives.
What, then, are we to make of U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton?20 The Court invalidated an Arkansas constitutional
amendment (approved by nearly 60 percent of voters) that
barred Arkansans who had served three terms in the national
House or two terms in the United States Senate from appearing
on the ballot for another term. The Court rested its decision on
a few key premises, a selective view of history, and a bundle of
unspoken assumptions. Let us start with this important premise:
"In [the] National Government, representatives owe primary
allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the
Nation."
2 1
Lest there be any doubt on this point, the Court invoked
Powell v. McCormack 2to assert that it is a "fundamental principle
of our representative democracy... 'that the people should
choose whom they please to govern them.' 2 '; The Court's
invocation in Powell of Alexander Hamilton's phrase made sense.
After all, in Powel4 the electoral choice of the people of Harlem
had been vetoed by the massed electoral choices of everyone
outside of Harlem. Justice Stevens's reliance upon it in U.S. Term
Limits made a lot less sense. As he put it, in order for the people
of Arkansas to be free to choose who should govern them, they
must be denied the freedom to choose. Before we accuse Justice
Stevens and his majority colleagues of partaking of the classic
reasoning of the Vietnam War ("It became necessary to destroy
the village to save it." 24), we ought to consider the relationship of
19. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendment Act of 1985 that required the States in some circumstances to take
titie to internally-generated radioactive waste, because the Constitution does not permit
the federal government to coerce the States into enacting a federal regulatory scheme).
20. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
21. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
22. 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (holding that the House of Representatives lacks authority to
exclude any duly-elected person who meets the constitutional requirements for
membership).
23. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 793 (quoting 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 257 (1836)
(statement of Alexander Hamilton in the New York constitutional ratification debate)).
This statement by Alexander Hamilton is also cited in Powell, 395 U.S. at 547.
24. MajorDesaibes Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,1968, at 14.
892 [Vol. 20
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this quotation to the key premises upon which U.S. Term Limits is
built.
First Premise: Members of Congress owe their allegiance to
the people of the entire nation, not those of any State.
Second Premise: The people must be free to choose their
representatives in Congress.
Unavoidable Fact: All members of Congress are elected by the
people of a State or a portion of a State.
Unproved (and Unspoken) Assumption: Uniform electoral
rules are necessary to freedom of electoral choice.
Conclusion: A single State's attempt to limit service of its
representatives in Congress interferes with the freedom of the
people of the entire nation to choose their representatives in
Congress.
This chain of reasoning may be correct, but the Court did not
prove it. Our republican form of national government "owes its
existence to the act of the whole people who created it." 2
Congress is the body that legislates for the nation, a reflection of
,26"It]he political identity of the entire people of the Union."
Surely "there exists a federal right of citizenship, a relationship
between the people of the Nation and their National
Government, with which the States may not interfere." Perhaps
it follows that "the Arkansas enactment intrudes upon this" 28
federal domain, but if so, it is only because members of
Congress owe their fealty to the nation as a whole, rather than to
their state constituents.
The Court in US. Term Limits may also have gotten its history
right, though that is debatable. Stitching together snippets from
Madison's Federalist Nos. 52 and 57,29 expressions of concern in
the 1787 Convention that the States might abuse the power to
regulate elections for federal office,3° and the absence of any
claim made in the ratification debates that the States could add
25. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 839 (Kennedy,J, concurring).
26. Id. at 841.
27. Id at 845.
28. I
29. See id. at 806-08 (majority opinion) (citing THE FEDERAuST Nos. 52, 57 (James
Madison)).
30. See US. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 808-09 (citing 2 THE RECORDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
No. 3] 893
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to the constitutionally specified eligibility requirements,"I the
Court concluded that "the Qualifications Clauses were intended
to preclude the States from exercising any... power" to impose• 32
term limits on their congressional representatives. Suppose
that the Court in U.S. Term Limits correctly deciphered the
Framers' original intentions, as it claimed to do, and suppose
that the original intentions control judicial decisionmaking, as
the Court implied by placing so much reliance on its reading of
the Framers' intent. If these suppositions are correct, the
fundamental rationale for Garcia is impeached. The Court in
Garcia was convinced that the Framers' intentions were to create
a structure in which members of Congress would be politically
accountable to their state electors and responsive to their
parochial concerns. The Court in U.S. Term Limits then
concluded that the Framers intended to create a structure in
which state electors cannot subject their members of Congress
to the final accountability of forced rotation.
These positions may be reconciled, but the reconciliation is
not very convincing. It is possible that denial of a State's power
to impose term limits does not destroy effectively the political
accountability of members of Congress to state concerns.
Members of Congress might retain their offices because of their
constant attention to state concerns, but that conclusion rests on
pure supposition about changing political preferences and the
dynamics of the political process itself (including such distorting
phenomena as nationwide fund-raising, "independent" political
expenditures, and the name recognition and franking privileges
attendant to incumbency). It is not a conclusion mandated by
the structure of government. The Court in Garcia contended that
the structural apparatus itself guarantees that the States'
autonomy will be preserved. The Court in U.S. Term Limits
contended that the structural apparatus guarantees that
congressional "representatives owe primary allegiance not to the
people of a State, but to the people of the Nation. * If the U.S.
Term Limits structure is sound, Garcia's structure is gossamer
imagination. If Garcia's structure is real, it is based upon a
structural tie between members of Congress and their States. But
31. See i& at 809-10.
32. M at 806.
33. I&. at 803.
[Vol. 20
The Tao of Federalism
U.S. Term Limits denied to the States any power to create such
ties, asserting instead that the States have no claim whatever
upon the fealty of their federal representatives. If so, Garcia
cannot be correct. If not, then U.S. Term Limits is wrong. Sadly,
the Court's opinion in U.S. Term Limits offers no consideration
of this tension.
II. WHY ISN'T THERE A "SACRED PROVINCE OF STATE AUTONOMY"?
In Garcia, the Court quickly belittled and ultimately dismissed
the idea that there is some domain of public policy that is
reserved exclusively to the States. "Any substantive restraint on
the exercise of commerce powers... must be tailored to
compensate for possible failings in the national political process
rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy."' '
The Court's view was that "the purpose of [state] constitutional
immunity... is not to preserve a 'sacred province of state
autonomy.' .... With rare exceptions.., the Constitution does
not carve out express elements of state sovereignty that Congress
may not employ its delegated powers to displace."
In doing this, the Court parsed the Framers' original
intentions to conclude that "the principal means chosen by the
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies
in the structure of the Federal Government itself." 6 The Garcia
Court's originalism is a bit astigmatic because the Court failed to
consider what is perhaps the keystone architectural element of
the "structure of the federal government"-the unprecedented
decision to endow the central government with no power to do
anything at all except through the use of a few (albeit important)
explicitly enumerated powers. Of course, it is axiomatic that the
domain of exclusive state power begins where the federal powers
end. In that sense, the Tenth Amendment is surely a truism. But
it is a truism that is "an exclamation point to the concept of
",37limited federal powers.
This is the yin and yang of federalism. The yang is the grant of
federal power; the yin is the undeniable fact that "[t]he
enumeration [of federal powers] presupposes something not
34. Garcia, 469 U.S. at554 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236 (1983)).
35. I& at 550 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 236).
36. Id
37. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 44 (1995).
No. 3]
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enumerated" -- the exclusive domain of state power. But there
is no yin without yang, nor any yang without yin. The Court's
problem is that its jurisprudence is all yang and no yin. If one
stares constantly at the blazing light that dissolves all shadow,
one will lose any sense of darkness.
The Court has been mesmerized by the blaze of federal
powers in two principal ways. First, it has all-too-readily
abdicated any judicial review of the scope of federal powers. In
Garcia, the Court did this openly, by declaring that federalism
was only politically enforceable-there was no role for the Court
to police the use of the commerce power to regulate the States.
More generally, the Court has retained the appearance of
judicial review while abandoning its exercise. The Court has
articulated a varied set of tests of the validity of exercise of
federal powers, but all of them are flaccid permutations on
rational-basis minimal scrutiny.*9 The result is that the extent of
federal powers is determined by those who wield them. Is it any
surprise that federal power seems limitless, a bloated caricature
of the original design? There is only the yang-the constitutional
grant of power to the federal policeman, augmented by the
Court's decision to let the federal cop voluntarily limit his
power.
Chief Justice John Marshall thought there was also a yin: "The
enumeration [of federal powers] presupposes something not
enumerated,"0 a something that is the sphere of exclusive state
power. But ChiefJustice Marshall is long dead, and now we have. .. . 41...
a living Constitution. In fact, the ChiefJustice had it right. It is
well known to us, and was even better known to Chief Justice
Marshall, that the Federalists objected to the addition of a bill of
rights for two reasons: a bill of rights "would result in the loss of
rights not enumerated," and "it would undermine the
enumerated powers scheme. 42  Most notably, Alexander
38. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
39. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 16, at 180-86 (discussing areas where the Court grants
deferential review to Congress's use of its powers).
40. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
41. So why is the Court so anxious to claim that its federalism decisions are rooted in
original intentions?Justice RobertJackson may have had an answer of sorts: 'We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,J., concurring).
42. David N. Mayer, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Supreme Court's Rediscoveiy of the Tenth
Amendment, 25 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 339, 413 (1996).
896 [Vol. 20
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Hamilton contended that a bill of rights would be "dangerous"
because it
would contain various exceptions to powers which are not
granted; and on this very account, would afford a colourable
pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?
Why... should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall
not be restrained, when no power is given by whichS45
restrictions may be imposed?
A bill of rights, said Hamilton, could "fumish, to men
disposed to usurp, a plausible pretence for
claiming... power."44 To prevent the creation of implied federal
powers, it was necessary to add the Tenth Amendment. Far from
being merely a truism, the Tenth Amendment was supposed to
furnish an express principle by which to construe the proper
scope of federal powers•.4 ' The Tenth Amendment provided the
yin for the yang of federal power.
When Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court in Garcia,
sneered at the notion of a "sacred province of state autonomy,,
46
he revealed his lack of understanding of the deeply
interconnected role of the Tenth Amendment and the scope of
federal power. To Justice Blackmun, the Court only needed to
ascertain the scope of federal power in isolation. But the
Constitution's structure does not permit such a one-sided analysis.
Ironically, in his opinion in Garcia, Justice Blackmun relied on
structure even while he was ignoring it. Perhaps one should
annotate Chief Justice John Marshall's famous epigram, "we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding,"" by
noting that when construing a constitution, one must necessarily
construe all of it. It is a hologram, not a menu. Chief Justice
Marshall understood this. In McCulloch v. Maryland, he observed
that "the question, whether the particular power which may
become the subject of contest, has been delegated to the one
government, or prohibited to the other,... depend[s] on a fair
43. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed., 1961).
44. Id
45. "The Amendment was intended to provide a rule of construction against
additional federal power being inferred from the absence of limitations .... " Mayer, supra
note 41, at 352.
46. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
47. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
No. 3]
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construction of the whole instrument. "48 And a fair construction of
the whole Constitution, especially when done from the Court's
chosen originalist cum structuralist perspective, reveals that the
whole point of enumerating powers delegated to the central
government (rather than simply giving the central government a
catch-all police power) is to preserve a "sacred province of state
autonomy."
The best that can be said for the Court's effort in Garcia is that
it does not totally ignore the "sacred province of state
autonomy," but just leaves the boundaries of that province for
Congress to decide. This is rather like saying that the Soviet-
German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 did not ignore the
territorial integrity of Poland; it just left the boundaries of
Poland to be decided by Hiter and Stalin. The Court relied on
structure to abdicate judicial review, but in doing so, it ignored
the basic fact that judicial review itself is rooted in a structural
argument. The Court's view seems to be that the Constitution
implies the power of judicial review, except when its exercise is
inconvenient, difficult, or unpleasant-the Court is mighty
selective about when it uses judicial review.4
The most distressing aspect of the Court's refusal to recognize
the existence of any "sacred province of state autonomy" is its
method. The Court managed to combine originalist and
structuralist argument in a manner stripped of context. As a
result, the Court offered a skewed, atomistic perspective on
constitutional meaning that is not very convincing to anybody
who appreciates the larger context of the Court's chosen ground
of argument. This perspective is unconvincing because it misses
the Tao of federalism. The Court's method dutifully inquires
into one aspect of the totality that misses entirely the function of
the search. "We shape clay into a pot, but it is the emptiness
inside that holds whatever we want."50 The Court's approach to
federalism is like examining the shape of the clay to determine
what is inside the pot. To use a different Taoist metaphor:
48. Id- at 406 (emphasis added).
49. This is not entirely deplorable. I do not suggest that the Court lacks authority to
eschew judicial review, but I do suggest that when it does so, it ought to be because it is
obeying a constitutional directive. See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the
Constitutional Limits of the Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811
(contending that the abstention doctrines ought to be regarded as constitutionally
mandated).
50. LAO-TZU, supra note 2, at 11.
[Vol. 20
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"Look, and it can't be seen. Listen, and it can't be heard. Reach,
and it can't be grasped." 51 The Court is too busy looking,
listening, and reaching for the scope of federal powers in
isolation to understand the duality of the quest. Metaphorically,
the Court when approaching federalism needs to heed Lao-tzu's
advice: "Approach it and there is no beginning; follow it and
there is no end. You can't know it, but you can be it .... ,5 More
tangibly, the Court must remember that its reading of the scope
of the federal power must be done in light of a "sacred province
of state autonomy" that was created by the federal structure we
still profess to observe.
III. WHYLOPEZDOES NOT MATTERVERYMUCH
When the Court in United States v. Lopez invalidated part of
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, it was the first time in
nearly sixty years that the Court found that Congress had
exceeded its commerce powers. 55 Congress had prohibited the
possession of a gun in or within 1000 feet of a school. The Court
concluded that such gun possession did not substantially affect
interstate commerce and was thus beyond the scope of the
commerce power. Chief Justice Rehnquist restated the scope of
the commerce power to include "the channels of interstate
commerce .... the instrumentalities of... [or] persons or
things" actually in interstate commerce, and activities that
"substantially affect" interstate commerce. 56 The Gun-Free
School Zones Act sought harbor in the final category. The Court
did not depart from its standard of review: so long as the class of
activities regulated by Congress might rationally be thought to
affect interstate commerce substantially, the legislation would be
upheld. But the Gun-Free School Zones Act failed that test.
51. Id. at 14.
52. Id.
53. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
55. This statement excludes National League of Cities v. Useqy, 426 U.S. 833 (1976),
which I regard as based upon an "enclave" theory of state autonomy (some state activities
may not be reached by Congress even though they are within the scope of its commerce
power), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which exemplifies the wholly
procedural nature of process autonomy (Congress cannot coerce the States into
implementing federal regulatory schemes).
56. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
No. 3]
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The Court offered several reasons why gun possession in or
near schools could not rationally be thought to affect interstate
commerce substantially. First, the activity regulated had
"nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.""7
Nor did the regulated activity fall within the "protective
princile "s-the idea, first fully developed in the Shreveport Rate
Cases,' that a wholly intrastate activity could be regulated if the
regulation was "an essential part of a larger regulation of
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. ' "
Congress had not bothered to supply its reasons for thinking
"that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to
the naked eye."6' Consequently, the Court could only consider
after-the-fact arguments linking gun possession in or near
schools with interstate commerce. Those arguments boiled
down to the contention that gun violence constitutes a problem
that "has an adverse effect on classroom learning," which in turn
"represents a substantial threat to trade and commerce.""' The
Court concluded that this would "pile inference upon inference
in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States." 63
Although the Court recognized the fundamental truth that
the scope of federal power-in this instance, the commerce
power-must be construed in light of the retained general
police powers of the States, it took but a small step toward the
full realization of that vision. It did not take the opportunity to
declare that courts will not consider after-the-fact conjecture
about the supposed substantiality of the connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce. If Congress cannot
conceive and articulate a plausible relationship, no reason exists
57. Id at 561 (footnote omitted).
58. This phrase is used by, among others, Richard A. Epstein, in The Poper Scope of the
Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1399 n.28 (1987), and Laurence H. Tribe, in
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-7, at 313 (2d ed. 1988).
59. Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
60. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
61. Id. at 563.
62. Id. at 565.
63. Id. at 567.
[Vol. 20
The Tao of Federalism
for the Court to do its work for it later. Because the post-1937
Court has deferred to congressional judgment concerning the
scope of the commerce power, it has reason to demand that
Congress exercise some judgment about the scope of its powers
instead of proceeding on the apparently widely-shared
assumption within Congress that Congress can do what it wants.
The constitutional code words for this assumption are those
coined by Justice Brennan in a case, now overturned,
concerning the scope of congressional power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment: "deference [to congressional
judgment about the scope of its powers] was appropriate in light
of Congress' institutional competence as the National
Legislature."64 Because Congress is "institutional[ly] competent,"
according to Justice Brennan, we ought to vest control over the
scope of federal power to this competent body. Lopez interred
this wholly extra-constitutional source of limitless federal power,
at least with respect to the Commerce Clause. When Congress
regulates an activity that "substantially affects" interstate
commerce, after Lopez it had best declare the reasons for its
conclusion.
But the Lapez Court could have done more. Although the
majority opinion hinted that congressional regulation of
intrastate non-commercial activities not coming within the
protective principle might lie outside of the commerce power
altogether, it unfortunately did not so state. That is unfortunate.
It will require another case, perhaps involving the Violence
Against Women Act of 19945 or the Child Support Recovery Act
of 1992,6 to clarify what the Court meant by its distinction
between -commercial and non-commercial activities in
connection with the scope of the "substantially affecting
64. Metro Broad., Inc. v. Federal Comm. Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547,563 (1990).
65. Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16, 18, and 42 U.S.C.). Compare Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic &
State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (voiding the Act as beyond the commerce
power), with Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding the Act as within
the commerce power).
66. Pub. L No. 102-521, 106 Stat. 3403 (1994) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. §
228, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796cc, 3796cc-i to 3796cc-6). Compare United States v. Hampshire, 95
F.3d 999 (10th Cir. 1996), United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), and
United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996) (all finding the Act to be within the
commerce power), with United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa. 1995) and
United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (finding the Act to be outside
the scope of the commerce power).
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interstate commerce" branch of the commerce power. It makes
sense to conclude forthrightly that intrastate non-commercial
activities not within the protective principle are beyond the
commerce power, because that interpretation of the commerce
power takes seriously the premise that the enumerated power
presupposes a regulatory domain left for the States. The Court's
remarks on this point echo these views; perhaps it will explicitly
so hold in the future.
But the Court could have done even more. Justice Thomas
summarized the considerable defects of the substantial effects
test: it renders the Necessary and Proper Clause and a host of
specific powers-bankruptcy, patents, and copyrights, for
example-nugatory. M It cannot be confined to the commerce
power and so threatens to extend congressional power to
anything "not expressly prohibited by the Constitution,"69 thus
grotesquely transforming the Tenth Amendment. It is
inconsistent with much of what we know of the Framers' intent.
70
It is a perversion of Chief Justice Marshall's treatment of the
commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden71 and of the Court's
decisions in the century following Gibbons.12 Finally, combined
with the "cumulative effects" or "aggregation" principle of
Wickard v. Filburn, it creates an unlimited general police power
in Congress. 74 The Court ought to have discarded the entire
"substantial effects" test.
Even if the Court had four more justices with the vision and
courage of Justice Thomas, it would need to do far more than
Lopez could possibly have done. Confinement of the commerce
power to its intended and natural scope within the
constitutional architecture would simply encourage Congress to
substitute its spending or taxing powers. Any serious attempt to
67. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565.
68. See id. at 588 (ThomasJ, concurring).
69. Id at 589.
70. See id- at 591-92.
71. See id- at 594-97 (discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
72. See Lopez 514 U.S. at 597-99.
73. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the commerce power permitted Congress to
regulate a farmer's production of wheat for his own use, on the theory that even though
the effect of the individual farmer's actions on interstate commerce was trivial, the
aggregation of all such farmers' actions could affect interstate commerce significantly).
74. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 600 (Thomas,J., concurring).
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restore the balance of federalism must also impose equally
appropriate limits on the use of these powers.
The whole rationale for a taxing power is to enable a
government to raise revenue out of the pockets of the citizenry.
If a government wishes to regulate behavior, it may do so to the
extent that it possesses regulatory authority. This bifurcation of
taxing and regulatory authority is of no consequence to state
governments, which possess a general police power. But it is (or,
rather, ought to be) of great consequence to the federal
government, which possesses only a limited set of regulatory
powers. Of course, the Court has abdicated responsibility for
controlling the use of the taxing power for regulatory ends, with
the predictable result that tax policy is debated mostly in terms
of whose ox should be gored and how deep the wound should
be. The definitions, rates, deductions, and credits that litter the
income tax landscape are openly formulated to encourage or
discourage behavior. Some of this is unavoidable, as Justice
Jackson once noted: "[A]ll taxation has a tendency... to
discourage the activity taxed. One cannot formulate a revenue-
raising plan that would not have economic and social
consequences."7 5 But it is inexcusable for the Court to tolerate
taxes obviously designed simply to prohibit or encourage
behavior by resort to the weak rationale that it produces "some
revenue."76
Congress's abuse of the spending power is even worse. The
principal usurpation inheres in Congress's penchant for
conditioning the grant of money to the States on state
enforcement of federal regulations. At the very least, the only
conditions that Congress should be permitted to attach to grants
are those that specify precisely how the money is to be spent.
Anything else constitutes "'a regulation, which is valid only if it




This conclusion stems directly from the Court's conclusion in
United States v. Butler78 that Congress could spend for the general
welfare but could only regulate by invoking one of its specific
75. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 35 (1953) (Jackson,J, concurring).
76. Sonzinskyv. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 514 (1937).
77. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 216 (1987) (O'Connor, J. dissenting)
(quoting Brief for Amici Curiae National Conference of State Legislatures et al., at 19-20
(No. 86-260)).
78. 297 U.S. 1, 64-67 (1936).
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regulatory powers. The whole point of the conditional spending
gambit is to regulate. The only difference between conditional
spending and open regulation is that Congress uses the bait of
federal money to entice the States into the enforcement task.
Toleration of this constitutional deceit, as the current test
allows, is a constant reproach to the structure of federalism.
All of this flows from a common source-the refusal to
recognize the Tao of federalism. Since Franklin Roosevelt's
constitutional coup d'etat, there has been supine, uncritical
acceptance of the unbalanced notion that the scope of federal
powers can be determined by looking at them alone. This is like
assuming that when only one leg is broken, a person needs only
one crutch to move along nicely. Listen to Justice Robert
Jackson, Franklin Roosevelt's attorney general and appointee to
the Supreme Court, at the end of his distinguished career:
I think in the long run the transgressions of liberty by the
Federal Government, with its all-powerful organization, are
much more to be feared than those of the several states,
which have a greater capacity for self-correction.
I know that it is now regarded as more or less provincial and
reactionary to cite the Tenth Amendment .... But our
forefathers made it a part of the Bill of Rights in order to
retain in the localities certain powers and not to allow them
to drift into centralized hands ....
There is an old Taoist saying: "A thousand mile journey begins
with a single step." Perhaps with Lope the Court took that first
step.
79. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 71-72, 73-74 (1955).
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